

REMARKS

In response to the Office Action mailed November 27, 2007, Applicants respectfully request reconsideration. To further the prosecution of this application, each of the rejections set forth in the Office Action has been carefully considered and is addressed below. The application as presented is believed to be in condition for allowance.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §101

The Office Action rejects claims 70-78 under 35 U.S.C. §101, asserting that these claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

1. Claims 70-74

In Applicants' response mailed November 8, 2007, Applicants noted that claims 70-74 are directed to at least one computer readable medium encoded with instructions that, when executed, allow the instructions' functionality to be realized, and that MPEP §2106.01 states that a claimed computer-readable medium encoded with a computer program is statutory.

The Office Action responds, asserting that the, "the recitation of MPEP 2106.01 is out of context and ineffective because it does not respond to the issue of the computer readable media being defined as transmission media." The Office Action appears to assert that Applicants' specification, in paragraph 20, defines a computer readable medium as a transmission medium.

Applicants respectfully disagree. The cited portion of Applicants' specification states, "[a]s used herein, a "network" (e.g., network 103) is a group of two or more devices interconnected by one or more segments of transmission media on which communications may be exchanged between the devices. Each segment may be any of a plurality of types of transmission media, including one or more electrical or optical wires or cables made of metal and/or optical fiber, air (e.g., using wireless transmission over carrier waves) or any combination of these transmission media."

That is, Applicants' specification defines a **network** as a group of two or more devices interconnected by one or more segments of transmission media. Applicants' specification does not define a computer readable medium as including transmission media.

As discussed above, claims 70-74 recite at least one computer-readable medium encoded with instructions that, when executed on a computer system, allow the instructions' functionality to be realized. Thus, these claims are statutory and it is respectfully requested that the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. §101 be withdrawn. If the rejection is to be maintained, Applicants respectfully request clarification as to how the Examiner is using the definition of the term "network" from Applicants' specification to interpret the phrase "at least one computer readable medium."

2. Claims 75-78

In Applicants' response mailed November 8, 2007, Applicants pointed out that these claims were not directed to software *per se*, as each recites a hardware storage system, having hardware components. Applicants pointed out that the claim recites at least one storage device and at least one controller, each of which is a hardware component.

The Office Action appears to assert that it is reasonable to assert that the at least one storage device recited in claim 75 reads on software, apparently relying on a definition from the Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards and Terms.

Applicants have amended claim 75 to recite that the at comprises "at least one physical storage medium." It should be clear that claim 75, as amended, now recites a hardware components and is not directed to hardware *per se*. Accordingly, it is respectfully requests that the rejection of claims 75-78 under 35 U.S.C. §101 be withdrawn. If the rejection is to be maintained, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner provide copies of any extrinsic evidence (included the above-referenced technical dictionary) relied upon in interpreting a storage device to be software.

Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. §103

The Office Action rejects claims 65-78 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as purportedly being obvious over Stuart (2005/0055519) in view of Cossey (2005/0070622). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

Each of independent claims 65, 70, and 75 relates, in one way or another, to the retention period for a unit of content being stored in the content of the unit of content, the request to delete the unit of content identifying the unit of content using a content address generated, at least in part,

from at least a portion of the unit of content, and the portion of the unit of content used in generating the content address including the retention period.

The Office Action concedes that Stuart does not disclose these limitations, but asserts that “Cossey teaches wherein a previously-defined retention period for a unit of content is stored in the unit of content, wherein the request identifies the unit of content using a content address generated, at least in part, from at least a portion of the content of the unit of content, and wherein the at least a portion of the content of the unit of content includes the previously-defined retention period.”

The Office Action asserts that, “Cossey recites a user specifying 3 days which meets the limitation of a previously-defined retention period. The content unit address appears exemplified in retention section 425.”

As explained, in Applicants’ previous response, Cossey is directed to simplifying the task of “copying” data from one application program and “pasting” it in another application program (¶0019). As shown in Figure 1, Cossey discloses a technique by which information may be copied from one application program and automatically prepared, formatted, and pasted into another application program, without the user have to exit the current application program, open the destination application program, paste the copied text, and reformat it (¶¶0020-0031; Figure 1).

Figure 2 shows a graphical user interface 200 with a “paste where” menu item that, when selected, prompts a user to enter a target destination at which the selected text is to be pasted (¶0033). That is, a user can select some text to be copied and open the “paste where” popup menu 215. Selection of the “paste where” menu item causes a popup 215 to be displayed in which a user may enter a target destination in box 225 or select a target destination from a list 220 of predefined target destinations (¶¶0037-0038; ¶0042; Figure 2). The target destination is a destination at which the selected text is to be pasted.

Figure 4 shows a graphical user interface (GUI) 400 that is used to configure which items (and how many items) are displayed in the predefined target destination list in Figure 2 (¶0049). One option that may be specified via Figure 4 is to keep the most frequently used destinations in the predefined target destination list (¶0051). In addition, GUI 400 includes a history retention section 425 that allows a user to specify a duration for retaining information used to populate the predefined target destination list.

At ¶0052, Cossey discloses that if, for example, a most frequently used list mechanism is utilized for determining predefined target destinations, a user specifying three days in the history retention section 425 restricts a set of recorded target destinations to those occurring within the last three days. Similarly, the clear history button 430 causes a system to delete presently stored information tracked by the system relating to dynamically populating predetermined target destination lists.

The Office Action appears to assert that Cossey discloses “a previously-defined retention period for a unit of content” because Cossey discloses that a user may specify a period of three days in the history retention section 425. As discussed above, specifying three days in history retention section 425 causes the system to populate the predetermined target destination list to targets that have been used in the last three days.

To the extent that “three days” qualifies as a retention period for a unit of content, there is no disclosure that this purported retention period is stored in the content of the unit of content.

Clarification is respectfully requested as to what, in Cossey, the Examiner understands to be a content unit that stores, in its content, the retention period of three days.

Moreover, Cossey does not disclose or suggest a content address for a content unit that is generated from at least a portion of the content of the content unit. The Office Action asserts, “[t]he content unit address appears exemplified in retention section 425.” Retention section 425 in Figure 4 of Cossey includes the phrase “Days to keep pages in history” followed by a box where a user can input the desired number of days to keep target destinations in the list of predetermined target destinations.

The phrase “Days to keep pages in history” is not a content address for a content unit that is generated from at least a portion of the content of the content unit. **Clarification is respectfully requested as to what, in Cossey, the Examiner understands to be the content address and from what content the Examiner believes this content address is generated.**

As should be clear from the discussion above, Cossey does not disclose or suggest a retention period for a unit of content being stored in the content of the unit of content, a request to delete the unit of content identifying the unit of content using a content address generated, at least in part, from at least a portion of the unit of content, or the portion of the unit of content used in

generating the content address including the retention period. Thus, each of independent claims 65, 70, and 75 patentably distinguishes over Stuart and Cossey, whether taken alone or in combination. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) be withdrawn.

Claims 66-69 depend from claim 65, claims 71-74 depend from claim 70, and claims 76-78 depend from claim 75. Each of these claims is patentable for at least the same reasons as its respective independent claim. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the rejection of these claims be withdrawn.

CONCLUSION

A Notice of Allowance is respectfully requested. The Examiner is requested to call the undersigned at the telephone number listed below if this communication does not place the case in condition for allowance.

If this response is not considered timely filed and if a request for an extension of time is otherwise absent, Applicants hereby request any necessary extension of time. If there is a fee occasioned by this response, including an extension fee, that is not covered by an enclosed check, please charge any deficiency to Deposit Account No. 23/2825.

Dated: February 22, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

By Scott J. Gerwin
Scott J. Gerwin
Registration No.: 57,866
WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
Federal Reserve Plaza
600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02210-2206
(617) 646-8000